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social learningFollowing the crowd is usually dismissed as mindless acquies-
cence, devoid of original thought and authenticity. Despite this
seemingly undesirable predicate, in human interactions majority
inﬂuences seem pervasive, even beyond conscious control (Sweeny
& Whitney, 2014). The inﬂuence of majorities on individuals'
learning and decision making has therefore received ample atten-
tion in the scientiﬁc community. In particular, social psychologists
and cultural evolutionists have been intrigued; the former group of
scholars aiming at understanding the workings of speciﬁc social
inﬂuences (e.g. Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1936), the latter interested in
exploring evolutionarily stable strategies explaining the emergence
and persistence of cultural diversity (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985;
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). These focused investigations
have led to some seminal ﬁndings, for instance the robust fact that,
in certain contexts, roughly a third of human adults adopt an
erroneous majority stance against their better knowledge (Asch,
1956; Bond & Smith, 1996) and the mathematical fact that prefer-
entially adopting the majority strategy yields culture-like phe-
nomena (i.e. high level of within-group behavioural homogeneity
induced by social-learning processes) under a wide range of* Correspondence: E. J. C. van Leeuwen, Department of Developmental Psychol-
ogy, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, Am Steiger 3, Jena 07743, Germany.
E-mail address: ejcvanleeuwen@gmail.com (E. J. C. van Leeuwen).
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).conditions (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998;
Richerson & Boyd, 2005).
Despite subtle differences in approach and interpretation (van
Leeuwen & Haun, 2014; Morgan & Laland, 2012), most psycholo-
gists and cultural evolutionists have adhered to conformity's deﬁ-
nitional aspect of adopting the preferred strategy of the majority of
group members rather than simply the strategy observed most
frequently (see van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014), thereby following the
original deﬁnitions that emerged in the ﬁeld of psychology (Asch,
1956; Sherif, 1936) and the ﬁeld of the study of cultural evolution
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998), respectively. Be-
sides the beneﬁts of deﬁnitional consistency, there is another
reason for this particular adherence, which can be succinctly
summarized by appealing to ‘the wisdom of the crowd’. Mathe-
matical and empirical analysis shows that large groups of in-
dividuals are better equipped to ﬁnd correct answers to challenges
than relatively small groups, a phenomenon that is also referred to
as ‘collective cognition’ (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; King &
Cowlishaw, 2007; Wolf, Kurvers, Ward, Krause, & Krause, 2013;
note that ‘the majority’ by deﬁnition constitutes the largest portion
of the population). Intuitively, this ﬁnding can be understood by
acknowledging that the majority strategy is the strategy that most
group members, with their unique sets of learning skills, have
converged upon. As such, the majority strategy, usually, represents
a robust synergy of individual capacities for discovering useful
contingencies, which speaks to the adaptive potential of majorityf Animal Behaviour by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
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in many cases be biased towards the behaviour displayed by a small
group of close association partners, which, given the postulated
adaptiveness of the majority strategy, increases the probability of
representing a suboptimal solution.
Within this deﬁnition of copying the majority of group mem-
bers, the study of cultural evolution focuses on the dispropor-
tionate tendency of naïve individuals to adopt the majority strategy
(originally coined ‘conformist transmission’, see Boyd & Richerson,
1985). In contrast, the study of social psychology typically focuses
on individuals' tendencies to forgo their personal strategy and
adopt the conﬂicting majority variant (originally coined ‘confor-
mity’, see Asch, 1956). By now, a plethora of studies have evidenced
conformity in both human children (Corriveau & Harris, 2010;
Haun & Tomasello, 2011) and adults (Asch, 1956; Bond, 2005) and
some evidence for conformist transmission in human adults exists
as well (Coultas, 2004; Jacobs & Campbell, 1961; Morgan, Rendell,
Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2011). Recently, scholars have similarly
started to explore majority inﬂuences in nonhuman animals, either
for reasons of understanding species-speciﬁc learning patterns
(Aplin et al., 2014), or aiming at reconstructing the evolutionary
path that led to the conformity observed in humans (Whiten,
Horner, & de Waal, 2005). While this endeavour is to be applau-
ded, crucial mismatches between the original majority inﬂuence
constructs and the recent nonhuman animal studies signiﬁcantly
hamper our insights. By focusing on the most recent nonhuman
animal study in this area (Aplin et al., 2014), we wish to clarify the
study of majority-biased learning so that both species-speciﬁc
behaviour and the evolutionary trajectory of (human) tendencies
can be more validly assessed.
Aplin et al. (2014) claim an emergence and persistence of behav-
ioural traditions via conformist transmission and conformity inwild
great tits, Parus major. After training one individual in each of several
populations to obtain a reward from an automated food dispenser by
sliding a small door either to the left or to the right, the researchers
were able to observe how entire populations converged on the same
door-sliding technique, with some populations primarily sliding the
door to the left andotherpopulationsprimarily sliding thedoor to the
right (Aplin et al., 2014). Yet, while Aplin et al.'s evidence regarding
the emergence and persistence of great tit traditions (i.e. group-
speciﬁc behavioural variants) seems robust, representing an admi-
rable contribution to the limited literature on traditions in wild ani-
mals, their pivotal claims of demonstrating culture via conformist
transmission and conformity seemmisguided, as we argue below.
First and foremost, where Aplin et al. (2014) report that great tits
consider the majority when learning socially, they operationalized
the majority strategy as the strategy that is ‘performed most
frequently’. As explained above, however, in terms of both cultural
evolution and the study of psychology, the meaningful operation-
alization is the strategy that is ‘performed by most individuals’.
Sometimes these two deﬁnitions will capture the same thing, but,
crucially, sometimes they will not. If, for instance, individual A
performs Strategy 1 six times and individuals B, C, D and E perform
Strategy 2 once each, under Aplin et al.'s (2014) account Strategy 1
is the majority strategy, while, to the best of our knowledge, in
terms of all studies on cultural evolution, Strategy 2 would be
considered the majority strategy. Note that the aforementioned
synergy of individuals' learning capacities (collective cognition:
represented by themajority strategy) does not apply to behavioural
repetitions by one individual (in this example: individual A). Hence,
this critique is not just a plea for deﬁnitional consistency: (math-
ematical) logic and empirical work on the adaptiveness of majority
inﬂuences use ‘individuals’ as their locus of analysis, not mere
‘frequencies’ of behaviour patterns (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985;
Day, MacDonald, Brown, Laland & Reader, 2001; Hastie &Kameda, 2005; King & Cowlishaw, 2007; Wolf et al. 2013). Confu-
sion over individuals versus frequencies may arise because
modelling studies often use a conformist transmission function
expressed in terms of frequencies, but derived from the number of
individuals in a population (Walters & Kendal, 2013). Yet, a recent
empirical study even shows that the effects of individuals and
frequencies can be teased apart experimentally, with the evidenced
differences in behavioural outcomes corroboratively indicating the
necessity to refrain from confounding individuals and frequencies
(Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2012).
One way in which Aplin et al. (2014) claim that the majority
inﬂuenced the birds' behaviour is through conformist trans-
mission. Recapitulating, conformist transmission can be adaptive
because it represents collective cognition: it allows a learner to
integrate the output of multiple individuals' social and individual
learning experiences (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Richerson & Boyd,
2005). Under Aplin et al.'s (2014) operationalization of the ma-
jority, however, this advantage may not have been present.
Minimally, we must know how many other birds were actually
observed by the learners (including their relative strategy pref-
erences), yet these details are not provided (Aplin et al., 2014). If
Aplin et al. were able to reanalyse their data such that each indi-
vidual could be scrutinized in light of its unique individual-based
observation records (e.g. individual A observes three conspeciﬁcs
using Strategy 1 and nine conspeciﬁcs using Strategy 2), a valid
investigation of conformist transmission would be possible by
comparing the majority sizes they observed (in this example: 75%)
to their likelihood of adopting the majority strategy (in this
example: Strategy 2). Note that apart from the mathematical logic
and empirical ﬁndings postulating the adaptiveness of copying
the majority of individuals, which does not necessarily apply to
copying the majority of occurrences (see above), conformist
transmission has been coined as majority copying with the ma-
jority being operationalized in terms of individuals, not fre-
quencies (see Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998).
Note further that while conformist transmission can result in
tradition formation (Boyd & Richerson, 1995; Henrich & Boyd,
1998), the fact that Aplin et al. (2014) found that birds formed
traditions (i.e. behavioural homogeneity caused by social-learning
processes) does not in itself evidence conformist transmission (NB
this is not claimed by the respective authors, yet seems to be a
common misconception in the study of majority inﬂuences in
general). Traditions can arise and stabilize due to many different
transmission biases, not just conformist transmission (e.g. see
Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Haun, van Leeuwen, & Edelson, 2013;
Kendal, Coolen, & Laland, 2009). Then, in order to distinguish
between such transmission biases, detailed knowledge on in-
dividuals' observation records is required (e.g. Kendal et al., 2015).
Aplin et al. (2014) furthermore claim that the majority
continued to inﬂuence the birds, even after they had acquired a
working strategy. Two lines of evidence are provided for their
majority inﬂuence interpretation: (1) of the birds that used both
foraging solutions (N ¼ 78), eight gradually switched from using
the nonseeded variant to the seeded variant (while none made the
reciprocal switch) and (2) 10 of 14 birds switched their strategy
preference when immigrating into groups in which the alternative
solution had been seeded ‘to match the common variant in the new
location’ (Aplin et al., 2014). Aplin et al. interpret these cases as
evidence for ‘social conformity’, a term that refers to forgoing
preferred behaviour in order to match the majority of individuals
(see above: Asch, 1956). Aplin et al.'s study, however, does not
provide sufﬁcient evidence for conformity because, as previously
outlined, (1) frequencies do not necessarily equal individuals and
(2) it is unknown what the birds observed before switching their
preferences. In other words, in the cases where information was
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observed by the respective birds (i.e. residents switching from the
nonseeded to the seeded strategy), no information is presented on
across how many individuals these occurrences were distributed,
and in the cases where only the relative strategy preferences are
reported (i.e. immigrants switching their strategy ‘to match the
common variant in the new location’), the observation records of
the respective birds remain opaque. Hence, interpretation in terms
of majority inﬂuence (here: conformity) seems premature. Indeed,
a likely alternative explanation for the outlined behavioural pat-
terns is that the great tits employed a learning strategy in which
social information was always preferred over individual informa-
tion, perhaps especially when this social information was the most
recently acquired piece of information. For instance, the ﬁrst
‘conformity’ case reported by Aplin et al. (preference switch within
populations; see above) could be explained by the respective birds
individually learning the nonseeded foraging solution followed by
subsequent social learning of the seeded solution. In a similar vein,
the second ‘conformity’ case reported by Aplin et al. (preference
switch after immigrating into a new population; see above) could
be explained by immigrant birds updating their foraging strategies
by copying the behaviour of locally attuned conspeciﬁcs, for
instance based on a ‘copy when uncertain’ bias, since the respective
birds had entered a new group/environment. Crucially, such cases
of (biased) social learning do not automatically allow for interpre-
tation of the respective behavioural patterns in terms of majority
inﬂuences: while social inﬂuences comprise many different
mechanisms and biases, majority inﬂuence can only be demon-
strated by providing evidence of the behavioural inﬂuence being
caused by the majority of group members, e.g. by excluding alter-
native explanations (van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014).
In general, within-group behavioural convergence can come
about in many different ways and should not be taken as evidence
for majority inﬂuences without closer scrutiny, not even when in-
dividuals explore alternatives and reconverge on their ﬁrst learned
solution (see van Leeuwen & Haun, 2013; van Leeuwen, Cronin,
Schütte, Call, & Haun, 2013 in response to e.g. Dindo, Whiten, &
de Waal, 2009; Hopper, Schapiro, Lambeth, & Brosnan, 2011;
Whiten et al., 2005). Not only individual-learning proclivities (e.g.
‘habit formation’, see Pesendorfer et al., 2009), but also social-
learning tendencies other than majority inﬂuences must be ruled
out before (re)convergence patterns can be interpreted in terms of
majority inﬂuences (van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014). Another illus-
trative case of, in our view, premature majority inﬂuence conclu-
sions is presented in a recent wild vervet monkey, Chlorocebus
aethiops, study by van de Waal, Borgeaud, and Whiten (2013). In
this study, immigrating male vervet monkeys adjusted their food
colour preference (e.g. pink) to the food colour preference of the
new group (e.g. blue). This preference switch was interpreted in
terms of conformity, yet it was unknown what and whom the
immigrating males had observed prior to their preference switch-
ing (van de Waal et al., 2013). Instead, in both the great tit and
vervet monkey cases, it has been assumed (rather than empirically
shown) that the target individuals had observed the distribution of
strategies over the respective individuals. Apart from the lack of
scientiﬁc accuracy, this assumption seems very unlikely. For
example, the great tits foraged in ﬂocks of close to 100 birds (on
average), while the apparatus employed arguably only provided
room for a few birds at a time, making it very improbable that all
nonactors observed the actions of the actor (see Aplin et al., 2014).
Similarly, the vervet monkeys most likely foraged in subgroups
induced by dominance dynamics, making it plausible that not
majority inﬂuences, but other social inﬂuences were at play in
affecting the immigrants' food colour preferences (see van de Waal
et al., 2013).Overall, we wish to emphasize that the identiﬁcation of trans-
mission biases (e.g. copy dominant individuals, copy when uncer-
tain, copy the majority) requires robust measurement of
individuals' observation records and that it seems unnecessarily
inaccurate to make assumptions about these records when such
information can be approximated by more detailed analysis
(Kendal et al., 2015): potentially premature conclusions, in the
absence of supporting evidence regarding who observed whom
perform which strategy, will only hamper the empirical study of
transmission biases.Acknowledgments
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